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Public-private Partnerships (PPP) involving governments and insurers have been used 
globally in natural hazard mitigation. Yet high expense on building retrofit and 
catastrophe insurance still prevents government from providing effective mitigations. 
This thesis introduces a new framework that governments can utilize to motivate insurers 
to insure property owners with an affordable premium and receive a high proportion of 
reimbursement on retrofit investment. Two case studies in the thesis show a high 
feasibility of this partnership on hazard-prone areas and a higher total benefit than similar 
methods. The case study result indicates a wide feasibility of the proposed framework in 
risk mitigation of various natural hazards by providing building retrofit and catastrophe 
insurance incentive to property owners. This solution is likely to provide policymakers 
with a PPP program as a new tool for motivating the insurers and the property owners 
to undertake building retrofit and mitigation of natural disasters. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Natural disasters have been a growing issue for most regions and jurisdictions in the 
United States and globally. In United States alone research shows that natural hazard 
causes an average economic losses of 7.6 billion annually (Cutter & Emrich, 2005), while 
a single hazard can cause up to 200 billion economic losses (Burby, 2006). Yet although 
statistics have proved that the benefit cost ratio (BCR) achieves as high as 4.0 for overall 
hazard mitigation projects by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
investment on risk mitigation and transferring is still insufficient (Rose et al., 2007). The 
low occurring frequency of natural hazards lead to insufficient investment to risk 
management procedures, including building retrofit and catastrophe insurance, as a result 
of which natural hazards always causes a great amount of fatalities and economic losses, 
and can have long term effect to the fiscal situation of the affected jurisdiction. 
To bring a more resilient living environment and prevent catastrophic events from 
occurring after natural hazards, governments in various jurisdictions and countries are 
trying different methods to implement risk mitigation and insurance to local households. 
Government investment or subsidies to building retrofit projects and catastrophe 
insurances have been a major procedure of improving regional resilience. Other methods 
including insurance price rewards on high hazard-resistant buildings and mandatory 
catastrophe insurance purchasing are also implemented to different regions, while the 
effect of these methods is quite limited. A new method of effectively improving the 




1.2 Problem Statement 
Bringing affordable catastrophe insurance to market is difficult, due to low frequency but 
severe consequences of natural hazards. For instance, though earthquake risk is well 
understood by residents of California, the earthquake-insurance penetration rate is as low 
as 12% (Michel-Kerjan 2010). To reduce the potential damage from flood and hurricane, 
more than 68,000 flood insurance policies have already been implemented in force in 
Maryland according to data for 2009, while leaving the rest 98% households unprotected 
by flood insurance (FEMA, 2009b). The lack of effective risk reduction places hazard-
prone areas of the U.S. and world wide under potential significant loss from natural 
hazards. This problem becomes even more serious in developing countries, where both 
property owners and governments are more reluctant to invest in risk mitigation and 
transferring procedures (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2011). 
Major procedures for risk management against natural hazards can be classified 
into two types, risk mitigation approaches including retrofit to building and facilities, and 
risk transfer approaches such as catastrophe insurance. The low penetration of these two 
methods to regions subjected to natural hazard threat can be attributed to several reasons. 
High cost of implementing building retrofits has been the main reason to natural hazard 
vulnerability of residential areas, especially the relatively old communities. The high 
expense of retrofit implementation and indirect, unstable benefits lower the priority of 
building retrofit from both investment of property owners and subsidies from the 
government. As for catastrophe insurance, the low frequency and high consequence of 




firms compared to other types of insurance. Thus the expense of providing catastrophe 
insurance is more costly to both insurers and residents.  
In order to enhance the resilience against natural hazards and reduce the potential 
damage from emergency events, the problems mentioned above need to be solved. A new 
partnership framework combining different risk management methods is proposed in this 
thesis to solve the problems and help build a more resilient community. 
1.3 Objectives 
As stated above, the main problem in implementing risk mitigation and transferring 
methods can be divided into two parts: 1. The relatively high cost of building retrofit and 
insufficient government subsidies to the retrofit work. 2. The high-risk nature of the 
catastrophe insurance, which results in a high cost and less incentive for providing and 
purchasing the insurance. 
On the other hand, risk mitigation methods including building retrofit can reduce 
the damage and economic loss when natural hazard occurs, which makes the mitigation 
cost-effective over a long period of time in some cases. The aim of this thesis is to 
propose a new framework of partnership between government and insurance companies, 
which utilizes the potential benefit of mitigation methods to reduce the cost of risk 
mitigation and transferring methods, and stimulate the intention of purchasing and 
implementing these risk management procedures in the most endangered regions. 
Upon proposing the new framework, this thesis also focuses on evaluating the 
feasibility and effectiveness of this framework in various regions against multiple natural 




generated by this framework, while effectiveness will be evaluated by comparison to 
other similar methods on the cost effectiveness and other criteria. 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is divided into 5 Chapters. 
Chapter 1 gives a general introduction to the background of this framework. The 
sever impact of natural hazard to the economy and society to different jurisdictions in the 
United States and also to other countries around the world is presented. The potential 
problem of implementing effective risk mitigation and transferring method and a 
potential solution is also discussed. 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed review of the former research on most of the natural 
hazard risk management methods, including catastrophe insurance, building retrofit and 
the use of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in risk management. 
Chapter 3 proposes a new PPP framework that has a potential of solving current 
problems and stimulate the implementation of risk management procedures. The 
methodology related is also discussed. 
Chapters 4 and 5 evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness to multiple hazard 
scenarios and regions by investigating two cases, a seismic risk mitigation project in 
Israel and a flood risk scenario in Florida. A comparison between the proposed 
framework and other possible methods is also presented. 
Chapter 6 provides an overall evaluation to this framework in natural hazard 
management based on the assessment and case studies. This thesis concludes with a 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Governments have been subjected to significant economic burdens associated with 
covering the immense losses suffered by property owners in the wake of major natural 
hazards. The Chinese central government provided nearly 60% of the cost of building 
reconstruction after the Wenchuan earthquake of 2008 (Dunford, Li 2011). State-issued 
compensation following the Kobe earthquake in Japan in 1995 and Italy’s Umbria 
earthquake in 1997 was likewise very significant, at 40-50% of property owners’ total 
losses (Linnerooth-Bayer, Mechler 2007). Three major natural hazard risk-management 
practices are reviewed in this thesis: 1) Use of catastrophe insurance to transfer natural 
hazard risk; 2) use of building retrofit to reduce potential damage; and 3) the fostering of 
mutual motivation between the insurance industry and natural hazard-retrofit decision-
makers. Additionally, prior research on public-private partnerships (PPPs) that involve 
natural hazard mitigation methods is reviewed in this chapter. 
2.1 Use of Catastrophe Insurance for Hazard Risk Transferring 
Destruction of the built environment resulting from natural disasters has recently 
increased due to the repercussions of climate change and rapid urbanization in hazard-
prone areas; as a result, worldwide catastrophe insurance payouts have increased more 
than tenfold in the last 50 years (Grossi et al. 2005) and often place significant financial 
burdens on the insurance industry. Taking the 1994 Northridge earthquake in the United 
States as an example, the insurance industry financed more than 60% of the reimbursed 
loss, or approximately 30% of the total losses (Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler 2007). 




regions is still very low: in low- or middle-income countries, an average of only 1% of 
losses are covered by insurance (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2011), and even in developed 
countries such as the United States, around 50% of the single-family homes in flood-
prone areas are not covered by flood-insurance policies (Landry and Jahan 2011). One of 
the main reasons for these low penetration rates is that the high premiums charged for 
catastrophe insurance tend to deter property owners from purchasing it, an effect that is 
magnified in low-income communities (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2011). These high 
premiums mainly result from the abnormality of the events covered. In contrast to the 
high-frequency, low-consequence risks that the insurance industry typically deals with, 
such as petty theft, car accidents and so forth, the nature of natural disasters, i.e. low-
frequency and high-consequence – requires insurers to maintain very large capital sums 
as a strategy for forestalling insolvency in the face of significant potential payouts 
(Nguyen 2013). 
Although several financial mechanisms have been identified as solutions to this 
insolvency issue, most of them have been found to be too expensive for practical 
implementation. Reinsurance or catastrophe bonds, for instance, were investigated for 
their applicability to spreading the insolvency risk associated with earthquakes in Mexico 
(Cardenas et al. 2007); the results indicated that, although these mechanisms could 
successfully help a government to withstand an earthquake with a return period of 100 
years without any financing gap, the expense of the scheme could also be substantial. 
Moreover, studies have indicated that moral hazard and adverse selection operate in 
catastrophe-insurance markets, making private insurers reluctant to offer catastrophe 




2.2 Use of Building Retrofit in Risk Mitigation 
Whereas the main purpose of insurance is to transfer losses to other parties, the 
objective of natural hazard retrofit is chiefly to reduce the losses per se, especially from 
casualties. A number of researchers have investigated the natural hazard retrofitting of 
old buildings to enhance their structural performance, and in particular the social and 
economic benefits that can be ascribed to retrofit, in terms of reductions to both expected 
fatalities and recovery costs (Smyth et al. 2004; Kappos and Dimitrakopoulos 2008; Li 
2012; Valcárcel et al. 2013). While in many cases, retrofit actions have been justified as 
economically feasible during buildings’ service lives, several factors still prevent this 
mitigation option from being widely adopted in real-world settings. The high upfront cost 
has been identified as the main reason that property owners have been unwilling to take 
the action, even in situations where this initial investment could be compensated by the 
long-term benefits (Nuti, Vanzi 2003). Another reason for low intention in mitigation 
purchase is the uncertain nature of the benefit, unlike the high upfront cost of mitigation, 
the benefit of mitigation shows in the form of uncertain loss reduction in natural hazards, 
and often unable to sufficient purchasing incentive for property owners (Godschalk et al. 
2009). Consequently, several studies have utilized PPPs as a means of motivating 
property owners to undertake retrofit actions, specifically, by arranging that retrofit costs 
be reimbursed by the private sector. For instance, the Israeli government developed a 
national policy to encourage real-estate developers to retrofit old buildings in exchange 
for granting them the right to add additional dwelling units to the retrofitted structures. 
Understandably, however, this policy has only been found to be successful in areas with 




values tend to be more vulnerable to, and therefore more in need of protection from, 
natural hazards (Schmidtlein et al. 2011). 
2.3 Mutual Motivation between Insurance and Mitigation and Potential 
Partnerships 
Several studies have examined the effect of natural hazard retrofit on the behavior 
of insurers. (Kleindorfer, Kunreuther 1999) investigated the role of retrofit in 
improvements to insurers’ solvency by examining the expected economic impacts of 
natural hazards that were attributable to retrofit action. Their results show that smaller 
insurance premiums and lower deductibles can both be achieved through the 
implementation of building retrofits. Grossi et al. (2005) found that, as the percentage of 
property owners adopting retrofitting increases, so does the percentage of homes for 
which insurers are willing to provide coverage. On the other hand, some studies indicate 
that property owners’ motivation to undertake retrofit actions diminishes when they 
already have insurance coverage: a dynamic that would tend to increase the difficulty of 
combining these two supposedly complementary risk-mitigation strategies (Kleindorfer 
and Kunreuther 1999; Kelly and Kleffner 2003). However, a more recent study concludes 
that a combination of mandatory insurance and subsidized retrofitting could provide 
incentives to all parties involved in risk management plans (i.e., insurers, government and 
property owners), due to the positive effect retrofitting has on reducing insurers’ risk of 
insolvency (Peng et al. 2014). Since this positive effect of insurance coupled with 
building retrofit was first identified, a number of researchers have begun to focus on how 




In fact, many governments have utilized PPP approaches in cooperation with 
insurance companies to provide affordable natural-hazard cover to property owners. The 
Japanese central government, for example, has partnered with insurance companies to 
provide discounts on premiums of up to 30%, depending on the levels of seismic retrofit 
implemented (Tsubokawa 2004). Nevertheless, the involvement of insurance companies 
remains very low, with insurers only responsible for around 10% of the total liability 
associated with seismic insurance, as against the government’s 87% (Tsubokawa 2004). 
A national obligatory insurance program to mitigate earthquake impacts in Turkey, 
known as the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP), was established in 2001 as a 
partnership between the Turkish government and local insurance companies. The 
objectives of the TCIP include providing earthquake-insurance coverage to property 
owners at affordable yet actuarially sound rates; limiting the government’s financial 
exposure to natural disasters; and encouraging risk-transferring and risk-mitigation 
practices in residential construction (Gurenko 2006). With the help of its mandatory 
nature, as well as the reasonable premium levels that have resulted from state-of-the-art 
earthquake risk assessment, TCIP reached a 20% penetration rate within six years of its 
establishment (Cummins and Mahul 2009). 
Meanwhile, several PPP projects involving natural-hazard insurance have also 
been implemented in low-income regions. Micro-insurance, for instance, has become an 
increasingly popular hazard-insurance mechanism in the poorest parts of India. Micro-
insurance aims to provide low-income people with protection against specific hazards, 
such as earthquakes or drought, in exchange for a premium payment that is acceptable to 




government or NGOs. For this reason, micro-insurance has reached more than 10% 
penetration in low-income parts of India, as compared to the average of just 1 percent for 
low-income regions worldwide (Clarke and Grenham 2013). 
On the whole, despite the affordable insurance premiums that have resulted from 
most PPP frameworks developed in the past, low penetration rates due to the reluctance 
of property owners to purchase insurance still place a great financial burden on 
governments, while at the same time presenting a serious threat to insurers in the form of 
greater risk if only financial methods are used and no retrofits are implemented. 
Therefore, with the intention of addressing such gaps and utilizing the positive effect of 
retrofit in reducing insurers’ insolvency risk, the present study proposes an innovative 
PPP framework, involving the government, insurers and property owners, which is 
capable of lessening the financial support for retrofit works required from the government; 
reducing the insolvency risk of insurers; and motivating property owners to undertake 
these two risk-mitigation actions. It is hoped that the present research presented herein 
will serve as a basis for further studies of natural hazard mitigation through PPP 




Chapter 3: PPP Framework Statement 
3.1 Natural Hazard Risk 
Natural hazard events in this study are considered as events with certain probabilities of 
occurrence. To describe a hazard event, two properties are used in this thesis, including 
the level of significance k and the probability of occurrence 𝑝𝑘 within a return period, 
which is taken to be one year for purposes of this thesis. The damage to a building 
inventory in an natural hazard event k is calculated using HAZUS software, a 
standardized GIS-based risk assessment software developed by FEMA (FEMA, 2013a), 
which calculates damage status based on local conditions and can also be customizable 
based on other research assumptions. Damage to buildings after a catastrophic event is 
then classified into five groups as defined by HAZUS software, which are no damage, 
slight damage, moderate damage, extensive damage and complete damage respectively. 
According to the loss estimation from HAZUS simulation for each damage state, the total 
direct loss from a natural hazard event i is calculated as 𝐿𝑖. Historical data on catastrophe 
losses and occurrence probabilities in the study region is used to calculate the annual 
average loss (AAL) for that region, according to the equation presented below (Patel et al. 
2005). 
𝐴𝐴𝐿 = ∑ 𝑝𝑘 ∙ 𝐿𝑘
𝑘





Fig. 1: Typical natural hazard EP curve 
As is shown in Fig. 1, the exceedance probability (EP) curve for natural hazard 
risk in the study region is calculated from the AAL, with 𝑝𝑒 as the dependent variable and 
𝐿𝑒 as the independent variable. Based on the relationship between the magnitude and the 
return period of earthquakes, EP curve will contain a low-end, a mid-range, and a right-
hand tail, representing a relatively high probability of low-level losses and a low 
probability of extremely high losses. Pre-hazard retrofit can help reduce the potential 
consequences of various natural hazard scenarios. Depending on the different levels of 
pre-hazard retrofit that are applied to the building inventory, the cost of retrofit and the 
retrofitted buildings’ expected performance during a natural hazard can vary sharply. 
Nevertheless, by reducing potential levels of damage in a natural hazard, for example, 
earthquakes of different magnitudes, pre-hazard retrofit methods help reduce both the 




3.2 Insurance-Firm Insolvency 
In order to provide natural hazard coverage to policy buyers in case of extreme events, 
each insurance company seeks to maintain a certain capital value so that its annual 
probability of insolvency will not exceed a certain level, and the amount of capital value 
maintained to keep solvency is defined in this thesis as Required Holding Capital (RHC). 
To simplify this calculation for purposes of this thesis, financial methods of transferring 
insurers’ risks, such as reinsurance, are not considered, since risk transferring methods 
ultimately costs as much as, if not more than maintaining capital holdings. The amount of 
capital holding, then, is directly related to the potential losses to the insured properties in 
major natural hazards, defined as worst-case loss (WCL) (Patel et al. 2005). For 
insurance policies that include no deductible or a fixed deductible, the RHC for an insurer 
is considered almost equal to WCL, since WCL can be significantly larger than the 
aggregate amount of the relevant deductibles. Taking deductibles as a certain proportion 
𝜉 of the total loss associated with a group of policies, the relationship between RHC and 
WCL can be presented as: 
𝑅𝐻𝐶 = (1 − 𝜉) ∙ 𝑊𝐶𝐿                                                               (2) 
where: RHC – Required Holding Capital; WCL – Worst Case Loss; 𝜉  – Deductible 
Proportion. 
For a given building with insurance coverage, WCL is calculated from the 
building’s EP curve as the level of loss at an annual EP of 𝛿, which may change based on 
regulations imposed by government, and/or solvency considerations on the part of the 
insurer. The WCL at an exceedance probability of 𝛿 can be deduced from the EP curve 




the left-hand tail can be influenced by elements including premiums and deductibles; 
while the shape of the right-hand tail, which is related to the RHC, can only be improved 
by risk-transfer methods such as reinsurance or catastrophe bonds at a substantial cost, or 
else improving the resistance level to natural hazards of the building itself. 
An effective natural hazard mitigation project can change a building’s EP curve 
significantly. In general, because natural hazard mitigation improves the resistance level 
of the building to natural hazards of different magnitudes, the EP curve of the mitigated 
building would be located below its original EP curve, indicating that the EP of a 
particular amount of loss drops. For different parts of the curve, however, the EP may 
drop to different values below the original value, reflecting the varying performance of 
the mitigated building at different magnitudes of natural hazard. As previously mentioned, 
the influence that natural hazard mitigation has on the reduction of RHC is expressed by 
the potential loss at an EP of 𝛿. The reduction of potential loss at an EP of 𝛿 varies with 
the effectiveness of the natural hazard mitigation work. The benefit, for instance, 
reduction of this potential loss, should be weighed against the cost of natural hazard 
mitigation to determine whether mitigation alternative is desirable. 
3.3 Proposed PPP Framework 
Reduced insurance premiums have been widely used to incentivize property owners to 
undertake natural hazard-retrofit projects, with the premium reductions achieved through 
reduction of expected AAL. The proposed framework provides dual motivation for 
property owners – to undertake natural hazard retrofit and to purchase natural hazard 
insurance – funded by applying part of insurers’ benefit in terms of reduced RHC to 




mitigation is comparable, in certain cases, to the cost of the mitigation itself; and the 
opportunity for insurance companies to use such RHC reductions for further investment 
is of great value, which may be able to compensate for the cost of mitigation. 
As shown in Fig. 2, the proposed PPP model involves three parties: a relevant 
government agency, the insurer, and the property owner. For the property owner, an 
immediate building retrofit is encouraged by the offer of “free mitigation with the 
purchase of catastrophe insurance”, provided on the condition that they agree to sign a 
contract to purchase catastrophe insurance for multiple years, defined as the duration of 
insurance i. The government agency provides full building retrofit subsidies to the 
property owners who take up such insurance contracts, and is reimbursed for a large 
proportion of the subsidy money by the insurance company over the following years. The 
insurance company contracted with the property owners and the government agency is 
asked to reimburse certain proportion of the retrofit cost to the government agency in the 
contracted year j. This reimbursement will come from the insurer’s extra benefit in the 
RHC savings achieved by insuring a retrofitted rather than a non-retrofitted property. 
Thus, in regions where this framework can be applied, the partnership provides a 





Fig. 2: PPP framework for natural hazard mitigation 
As shown below in Table 1, the benefits of this PPP to a government include 
improved natural hazard-hazard resistance, increased insurance penetration, major 
reductions in the expected human and economic losses on its territory, and large 
reductions in the aggregate amount of government compensation payable to natural 
hazard victims. The property owners receive both natural hazard mitigation and insurance 
at the price of natural hazard insurance alone – or possibly a lower price than their 
insurance would have cost if mitigation work had not occurred. Finally, insurers are able 
to secure multi-year contracts on relatively low-risk buildings, allowing their expected 








 Baseline Situation Situation under PPP’ 
Government Low Mitigation & Insurance 
Coverage 
High Potential Loss & Fiscal 
Deposit After Natural hazard 
Providing the Mitigation 
Mortgage and Subsidy 
Higher Mitigation & Insurance 
Coverage for Vulnerable 
Regions 
Insurer High Premium Resulting in 
Low Policy Quantity 
High Potential Risk to Each 
Policy 
Reimbursing Part of Retrofit 
Cost 
Guaranteed Multi-year Policies 
with Lower Potential Risk 
Property 
owner 
High Cost for both Mitigation 
and Insurance 
High Natural hazard Risk and 
Casualty Rate 
Purchasing Multi-year Insurance 
Policy 
Free Mitigation with Discounted 
Insurance Coverage 





Chapter 4: Framework Evaluating Methodology 
4.1 Feasibility Measurement Criteria 
The proposed framework is economically feasible only if there is enough benefit to 
insurance companies that they are able to pay the cost of mitigation. The mitigation cost 
for a region k is denoted as 𝐶𝑘
𝑀 , and results in a reduced RHC denoted as 𝑅𝐻𝐶𝑘′. As 
stated previously, the EP of WCL is 𝑝𝑘
𝑅𝐻𝐶, while the RHC needed before mitigation is 
defined as 𝑅𝐻𝐶𝑘. The reduction in RHC for building k, ∆𝑅𝐻𝐶𝑘 = 𝑅𝐻𝐶𝑘 − 𝑅𝐻𝐶𝑘′. The 
benefit received by the insurer (Π𝑘 ) from mitigation is the opportunity cost for the 
reduction of RHC, which in this case can be calculated as: 





−  ∆𝑅𝐻𝐶𝑘                                          (3) 
where: rf – Risk-free Rate of Interest; γ  – Standardization Factor; t – Duration of 
Contract; ∆𝑅𝐻𝐶𝑘 – reduction in RHC for building k. 
Let us imagine a partnership in which the insurance company would like to use a 
certain proportion, defined as returning proportion (𝜂), of its annual benefit from the 
reduction in RHC to fund reimbursement of the government’s building-retrofit outlays. 
This reimbursement takes the form of one payment annually during each of the 
contracted years. For purposes of comparison with the retrofit cost, the total of annual 
reimbursements in future years is translated into current values. Then, for the duration of 
the contract 𝑗𝑘 (taking one year as the unit), the proportion of reimbursed retrofit cost 𝜁 





Π𝑘 ∙ 𝜂 ∙
(1 + 𝑟)𝑗𝑘 − 1
𝑟(1 + 𝑟)𝑗𝑘
𝐶𝑘
𝑀                                                    (4) 
where: r – Annual Interest Rate; Π𝑘  – Total Annual Benefit Received from this 
Framework; 𝜂 – Proportion of Benefit Used for Retrofit Reimbursement; 𝐶𝑘
𝑀 – Cost of 
Retrofit; 𝜁 – proportion of reimbursed retrofit cost; 𝑗𝑘 – contract year 
To guarantee the insurer a stable benefit income with which to pay the mitigation 
reimbursement, the duration of insurance (𝑖𝑘) should be no less than the reimbursement 
time, as: 
𝑖𝑘 ≥ 𝑗𝑘                                                                   (5) 
where: 𝑖𝑘 – duration of insurance; 𝑗𝑘 – contract year 
While implementation of this framework will always be profitable for the 
insurance company as long as ∆𝑅𝐻𝐶𝑘 ≥ 0 , the most appropriate decision-making 
criterion for its feasibility should be the reimbursement ratio 𝜁. The larger the value of 𝜁, 
the greater the economic viability of the partnership. 
4.2 Effectiveness Measurement Criteria 
While the reimbursement ratio 𝜁  reveals the economic feasibility of introducing the 
proposed PPP framework in different regions, the total benefit produced by this 
framework also needs to be calculated and compared against other traditional 
methodologies. The total annual benefit to all parties in region k under this framework is 
Π𝑘 (Eq. 3). Accordingly, to compare the benefit of this new framework with the typical 




Benefit Factor (𝜆) – as the ratio between the total benefit from this framework (Π𝑘) and 




                                                               (6) 
where: 𝜆 – Framework Benefit Factor; Π𝑘 – Total Benefit Received from this Framework; 
∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝑘 – reduction of AAL. 
A higher value of 𝜆  indicates a greater benefit generated from the proposed 
framework, while a 𝜆 value greater than 1 may suggest a more efficient way of utilizing 
natural hazard retrofit than traditional risk-mitigation instruments, such as a discounted 
insurance premium. 
4.3 Government Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) 
While in Section 4.3 the reimbursement ratio 𝜁  is defined to present the financial 
“benefit-cost ratio” for the government agency in this PPP framework, the real BCR for 
the government investment is also an important factor that presents the effectiveness of 
this partnership in the aspect of government agencies.  
A higher value of BCR indicates that the project would have a higher amount of 
benefit, which refers to a higher effectiveness in development of regional resistance to 
natural hazards specifically in this partnership, compared to other risk mitigation projects. 
This factor also helps to determine the investment priority of this partnership compared to 
other potential projects. 








                                                                 (7) 
where 𝐶𝑔 is the total amount of cost that government agency has made in the partnership, 
while 𝐵𝑔 presents the gross benefit, or reduction of hazard loss to the government in the 
following years until the building inventory reaches the end of its life-span. 
The government investment in this PPP framework can be divided into two parts, 
the initial subsidy invested for pre-hazard building mitigation and gross current value for 
the annual reimbursement received from insurance firm. As defined in Section 4.1, the 
initial subsidy invested is presented as 𝐶𝑘
𝑀, while the gross current value for the annual 
reimbursement can be presented as 𝜁𝐶𝑘
𝑀 . Thus, considering the reimbursement to the 
initial investment, the total amount of investment can be defined as: 
𝐶𝑔 = 𝐶𝑘
𝑀                                                                   (8) 
On the other hand, the benefit on the investment in the life span of building 
inventory, which can be defined as the total reduction of hazard loss to the government, 
can also be divided into two parts: 1. The reduction of economic loss of building 
inventory rehabilitation; 2. The reduction of fatalities and injuries during natural hazard. 
As defined, the gross return to the government agency through this partnership can be 
calculated based on the expecting AAL of the natural hazard and the years of life span for 
building inventory. By assuming the average life span of building inventory as 𝑙𝑠, the 
gross return to the government agency based on this partnership can be defined as: 
𝐵𝑔 = ∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝑘 ∙ 𝑙𝑠 + 𝜁 ∙ 𝐶𝑘
𝑀                                                 (9) 
Compared to the measurement factors given in Section 4.1 and 4.2, BCR values 




of a given PPP project from the perspective of a government agency. The comparison 
between BCR values for this project and for other government funded mitigation projects 





Chapter 5: Earthquake Case Study 
The expected economic losses that would be suffered by old reinforced-concrete (RC) 
buildings were estimated in all 12 neighborhoods of the city of Tiberias, Israel, under 
varying seismic scenarios. Two sets of assessments covered the as-built and retrofitted 
building inventories over their service lives (assumed for the purposes of this research as 
30 years). The proposed methodology was then verified in each neighborhood based on 
the expected losses to both types of inventories. 
5.1 Earthquake Loss Estimation 
Economic losses from earthquakes in the form of repair costs for a portfolio of 3,220 old 
residential RC buildings in Tiberias were evaluated using HAZUS. The old RC building 
stock was found to be the riskiest in terms of predicted seismic casualties: representing 40% 
of the total buildings in the city, with 48% of total annualized human losses from 
earthquakes (Wei et al. 2014). Three sub-cases: the as-built building inventory, and 
inventories retrofitted via two different design methods proposed by Shohet et al. (2013) 
were investigated for their seismic performance. The two retrofit approaches, RCrm and 
RCrh, were designed to satisfy different levels of seismic performance: RCrh to achieve 
HAZUS high-code performance at a high-level retrofit cost, and RCrm to achieve HAZUS 
moderate-code performance at a mid-level retrofit cost. The seismic events assumed were 
12 synthetic earthquake scenarios along four active and suspiciously active faults that 
were recently modeled by the Geological Survey of Israel based on local maps of the 
seismogenic zones (Shohet et al. 2013). Each event was named for its associated fault 
followed by its magnitude: Jordan 7.0, for instance, indicates a hypothetical 7.0 MW 




buildings that would be placed in each of the four building-damage states defined in the 











Jordan 7.5 1500 92 340 513 1024 
Poria 6.5 1200 182 496 626 597 
Almagor 6.5 900 273 575 600 346 
Jordan 7.0 850 288 578 581 326 
Jordan 6.5 800 418 568 402 95 
Almagor 6.0 650 436 559 368 64 
HaOn 6.5 600 438 542 349 64 
Jordan 6.0 500 454 469 250 29 
HaOn 6.0 250 430 344 139 8 
Bet HaKerem 
6.0 
200 430 327 121 5 
Almagor 5.0 150 248 110 23 0 
Poria 6.0 100 2 4 3 1 
Table 2: Number of buildings damaged in historical earthquakes (Wei et al. 2014) 
Based on data generated by prior research on the same region (Wei et al. 2014), the EP 




these three curves are depicted in Fig. 3. From the right tails of the EP curves, one can 
indicate that the reductions in economic losses associated with retrofitted buildings 
become more significant with the increasing severity of the seismic magnitudes (lower 
EP).  
 
Fig. 3: EP curves for different retrofit levels 
5.2 Retrofitting Reimbursement Calculation 
With regard to the EP curve for seismic building loss in the study region and each of its 
12 sub-regions, the expected reimbursement in a period 𝑗𝑘 can be calculated using Eq. 4 
& 5. The contract term is assumed to be 10 years, and the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) is used just as the offering rate 𝑟𝑓 in this case. For annual benefit, 𝑟𝑓 in this 
case can be defined as an interbank offered rate for three months and 𝛾 = 3, in a financial 
standard, while 𝑡 = 12  indicates that the benefit is counted once every 12 months 
(Brealey 2012). In consideration of the highly fluctuating nature of 𝑟𝑓 and the relatively 
long-term contract investigated in this thesis, the value of 𝑟𝑓 is used as an average of U.S. 




(ICE Benchmark Administration Limited (IBA) 2014). The insurer’s acceptance level of 
annual insolvency probability (𝛿𝑘) is assumed to be 1%, based on the annual average 
insolvency rate of insurance companies (Zanjani 2002). The annual interest rate is 
assumed to be 7% (Patel et al. 2005). We also assume that the benefit from reduction in 
RHC is evenly shared by the government and the insurer, which means 𝜂 = 50% in this 
case. For insurance policies with no deductibles (𝜉 = 0), the estimated largest possible 
payback ratio, by contract year, is shown in Fig. 4.  
 
Fig. 4: Estimation of seismic mitigation reimbursement ratio (𝜂 = 50%, 𝑖 = 10) 
To better understand how the benefit generated by this framework may differ 
from the pure benefit of seismic retrofit, the Framework Benefit Factor 𝜆  has been 






































Fig. 5: Estimation of framework benefit factor (seismic) (𝜂 = 50%, 𝑖 = 10) 
In the aspect of government agencies involved, the BCR of this PPP framework is 
also investigated based on the equation in Section 4.3. Based on the mitigation cost 𝐶𝑘
𝑀, 
the reduction of AAL due to the implementation of building retrofit, and the 
reimbursement ratio 𝜁, assuming that the life span of average building inventory is 40 
years 𝑙𝑠. The BCRs of this PPP framework to government agency in each study region 









































Fig. 6: Estimation of real BCR for government (seismic) 
As shown in Fig. 6, compared to the average BCR in FEMA invested earthquake 
mitigation projects, which is equal to 1.5 (Rose et al., 2007), the average BCR in the 
partnership proposed can be higher or at the same level. Unlike the traditional 
investments, a large part of the benefit to the government is direct financial 
reimbursement instead of only expected loss reduction. In specific cases where the 
regional vulnerability is relatively high and earthquake mitigation is more needed, the 
PPP framework BCR can achieve as high as 2.99, which is 99% higher than the average 
BCR of FEMA earthquake mitigation projects. 
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analyses are conducted using two criteria: the reimbursement ratio 𝜁 
representing the feasibility of the framework, and the framework benefit factor 𝜆 
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parameter utilized in this framework, one can investigate the sensitivity of this 
framework via several parameters involving the value of rf, contracted year i, and the 
annual interest rate r. The other parameters will remain the same as in Section 5.2, and 
the mid-level retrofit and its consequences vis-à-vis the whole study region are 
considered in this analysis. The data for reduction in AAL (∆𝐴𝐴𝐿) was analyzed and 
presented in a previous study (Wei et al. 2014). 
 
Fig. 7: Sensitivity analysis based on varying rf (seismic) 
The LIBOR rate for the U.S. dollar, used here to calculate rf, has been a highly 
fluctuating variable in recent years, with a range from about 0.5% to 12%. Fig. 7 shows 
the feasibility and relative benefit of the proposed framework for its best performing 
region – Region 462, under rf values from 0.5% to 11%. It is worth noting that the 
















































with the risk-free rate of interest rf, and that the feasibility of the framework is highly 
influenced by rf. For the lowest point, i.e. where rf is 0.5%, the 10-year reimbursement 
ratio is only 5.65% and its positive effect on retrofit is likely to be minor; whereas when 
rf reaches 8%, a full reimbursement can be achieved within 10 years. Considering a 
highly fluctuating rf and a relatively long period of framework implementation, the use of 
average reimbursement ratio presented in Retrofitting Reimbursement Calculation 
Section can be a more accurate estimation.  
 
Fig. 8: Sensitivity analysis based on varying contract term (seismic) 
Fig. 8 sets forth the average reimbursement ratios for possible contract lengths 
ranging from one year up to the expected building service life of 30 years. Since 𝜆 is an 
annual measuring factor and therefore unaffected by variance in the contract term, it is 
not included here. Due to the loss for future incomes as current value, the relationship 
























framework diminishes. Over a building’s service life, the framework is expected to 
provide 40% reimbursement of the retrofit cost. 
 
Fig. 9: Sensitivity analysis based on varying annual interest rate (seismic) 
The effect of the annual interest rate (r) in this framework ranges from 3% to 
7.5%. Again, as in the case of contract length and for the same reasons, only the 
reimbursement ratio is investigated. As shown in Fig. 9, the average reimbursement ratio 
exhibits a minor decrease as the annual interest rate increases, since the standard (r) of 
calculating equivalence current value from future incomes changes.  
5.4 Discussion 
From the results presented in Section 5.2, it can be seen that the benefit from retrofit-
derived reductions in RHC can, in some cases, offset the entire retrofit cost within 10 
years. However, the ratio of the benefit to the original retrofit cost varies immensely, 

























the available retrofit alternatives. In the particular case discussed in this thesis, a mid-
level retrofit would always be more cost-effective than a high-level one. As regards 
differences between sub-regions, one can assess the mid-level retrofit’s effectiveness 
level in different neighborhoods by considering the reduction of completely damaged 
buildings as a proportion of the total building inventory in the region, following major 
earthquakes (i.e. with return periods of 1,500, 1,200 and 900 years). The results of this 
assessment are shown in Fig. 10. 
 
Fig. 10: Proportion of buildings in a state of complete damage 
It can be seen that the values in Fig. 4 and Fig. 10 are highly correlated, meaning 
that the framework is more cost-effective in areas with higher vulnerability to 
earthquakes. This feature may be key to generating market-driving earthquake-mitigation 




































resistant regions, in light of seismic retrofit reimbursement of perhaps less than 20% and 
a payback time as long as 10 years; however, in highly vulnerable regions, a partnership 
between government and insurer alone can provide enough benefit to cover the whole 
retrofit cost, and this should make it attractive to all parties. Fig. 5 has also shown that the 
total benefit from this PPP is up to double the amount of benefit utilized from the 
reduction of AAL each year, which can provide a much higher motivation to undertake 
seismic retrofit in highly vulnerable regions. It is also worth noting the potential that the 
use of this framework is not necessarily limited to earthquake-mitigation purposes, but 
could have a wide range of applications in areas confronting other natural hazards and 
requiring similar patterns of building retrofit and catastrophe insurance. The detailed 
analysis for the implementation of this framework in flood mitigation is investigated in 
Chapter 6. 
The sensitivity analysis has shown that the proposed framework is highly affected 
by the risk-free rate of interest, which is inherently highly fluctuating. Yet, if a mitigation 
project is maintained as a long-term partnership, the influence of rf can be minor. The 
research suggests that longer contract periods can result in a slightly lower marginal 
benefit, and so a partnership length at which the reimbursement ratio is satisfactory to the 
government is likely to be the optimum choice. A lower interest rate, meanwhile, can 
result in a slightly higher reimbursement ratio, yet such changes can be minor and may 




Chapter 6: Flood Case Study 
 
The expected economic losses that would be suffered by old reinforced-concrete (RC) 
buildings in the county of Miami-Dade in State of Florida, under various flooding hazard 
scenarios, is estimated. Two sets of assessments covered the as-built and retrofitted 
building inventories over their service lives (which were estimated for purposes of this 
research as 30 years). The proposed methodology was then verified in each regions and 
flood zones, based on the expected losses to both types of inventories. 
6.1 Flood Loss Estimation 
Economic losses from floods, in the form of repair costs for a portfolio of 9669 single 
dwelling residential buildings in Miami-Dade county, were evaluated using HAZUS MH 
2.2. The residential building stock was found to be the of high flood risk in this county, 
where most of the living areas are classified as Costal A Zone (Miamidade.gov, 2015). 
Two sub-cases – the as-built building inventory, and inventories retrofitted via house 
elevating – were investigated for their flood performance. The building performance in 
as-built protection level is estimated using the default value in HAZUS MH 2.2 database. 
As shown below in Table 3, the percentages of damage to each water depth for various 







Building Code Building Structure Water Depth (feet) 
 
 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
R11N one floor, no basement,  A-
Zone 
0 0 0 0 18 22 25 28 30 31 40 43 
R11B one floor, w/ basement, A-Zone 7 7 7 11 17 21 29 34 38 43 50 50 
R12N two floors, no basement, A-
Zone 
0 0 0 0 11 12 14 18 20 22 24 26 
R12B two floors, w/ basement, A-
Zone 
4 4 8 14 19 21 26 29 34 39 44 50 
R13N three or more floors, no 
basement, A-Zone 
0 0 0 0 5 8 12 17 19 22 24 25 
R13B three or more floors, w/ 
basement, A-Zone 
3 3 6 10 12 14 20 25 31 36 38 41 
Water Depth (feet) 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
43 45 46 47 47 49 50 50 50 51 51 52 52 53 53 54 54 
54 55 55 57 58 60 62 63 65 67 69 70 72 74 76 77 79 
30 34 38 39 40 42 43 44 45 47 48 49 50 52 53 54 56 
55 57 59 61 63 65 66 68 69 71 72 74 75 77 79 80 82 
30 35 38 39 40 42 43 44 45 47 48 49 50 52 53 54 56 
44 48 50 52 54 56 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 





The elevation retrofit approach can lift the house an average of 4 feet with an average 
cost of $20350 per household, indicating that the percent of damage after retrofit would 
result in the amount of damage for a flood that is 4 feet lower than the original one 
(Kreibich et al., 2005). As shown below, the flood scenario is this study is assumed to 
occur on the eastern coast of Miami-Dade county.  
 
Fig. 11: Flood affecting coast layout (Obtained from ArcGIS) 
The hazard damage estimation is calculated based on the historical data of Miami-Dade 




listed below in Table 4, and the estimated loss of 10-year to 500-year flood hazard as 
well as the AAL for the flood hazard is estimated using HAZUS MH 2.2 based on the 
data listed. 
Coast 





10%  2%  1%  0.2%  
Eastern 
coast 
5 6.2 6.6 7.6 AE 6 
Table 4: Stillwater elevation data (FEMA, 2009b) 
Based on data calculated above, one can created EP curves for the as-built inventory and 
retrofit design, the AALs and 100-year losses (WCL in Chapter 3.2) for each retrofit level 
are calculated from the EP curves for further estimation.  
6.2 Retrofitting Reimbursement Calculation 
Same as Chapter 4.2, with regard to the EP curve for flood building loss in the study 
region and each of the 7 major census blocks within, the expected reimbursement in a 
period 𝑗𝑘 can be calculated using Eq. 3 & 4. The contract term is assumed to be 10 years, 
and the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is used just as the offering rate 𝑟𝑓 in 
this case. For annual benefit, 𝑟𝑓 in this case can be defined as an interbank offered rate 
for three months and 𝛾 = 3 , in a financial standard, while 𝑡 = 12  indicates that the 
benefit is counted once every 12 months and the value of 𝑟𝑓 is used as an average of U.S. 
dollar LIBOR from the last 10 years as provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis (ICE Benchmark Administration Limited (IBA) 2014). The insurer’s acceptance 
level of annual insolvency probability (𝛿𝑘) is assumed to be 1%, based on the annual 
average insolvency rate of insurance companies (Zanjani 2002) and the annual interest 




reduction in RHC is evenly shared by the government and the insurer, which means 𝜂 =
50%  in this case. For insurance policies with no deductibles (𝜉 = 0), the estimated 
largest possible payback ratio, by contract year, is shown in Fig. 12.  
 
Fig. 12: Estimation of flood mitigation reimbursement ratio (𝜂 = 50%, 𝑖 = 10) 
To better understand how the benefit generated by this framework may differ 
from the pure benefit of flood retrofit, the Framework Benefit Factor 𝜆  has been 

























Fig. 13: Estimation of framework benefit factor (flood) (𝜂 = 50%, 𝑖 = 10) 
BCR of this PPP framework is also investigated based on Eq. 7 in Section 4.3. 
Based on the mitigation cost 𝐶𝑘
𝑀 , the reduction of AAL due to the implementation of 
building retrofit, and the reimbursement ratio 𝜁, assuming that the life span of average 
building inventory is 40 years 𝑙𝑠. BCR values of this PPP framework for a government 































Fig. 14: Estimation of real BCR for government (flood) 
As is shown in Fig. 14, compared to the average BCR to FEMA invested flood 
mitigation projects, which is 5.0 (Rose et al., 2007), the average BCR in the partnership 
proposed can be 12% higher in total. In specific cases where the regional vulnerability is 
relatively high and flood mitigation is more needed, the PPP framework BCR can achieve 
as high as 9.72, which is 95% higher than the average BCR of FEMA flood mitigation 
projects. 
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analyses are also conducted using two criteria: the reimbursement ratio 𝜁 
representing the feasibility of the framework, and the framework benefit factor 𝜆 
representing its benefit level. Because of the highly changeable nature of financial 
parameter utilized in this framework, one can investigate the sensitivity of this 

















annual interest rate r. The other parameters will remain the same as in Chapter 6.2, and 
the mid-level retrofit and its consequences vis-à-vis the whole study region are 
considered in this analysis.  
 
Fig. 15: Sensitivity analysis based on varying rf (flood) 
The LIBOR for the U.S. dollar, used here to calculate rf, has been a highly 
fluctuating variable in recent years, with a range from about 0.5% to 12%. Fig. 15 shows 
the feasibility and relative benefit of the proposed framework in its best performing 
census block, block No. 2, under rf values from 0.5% to 11%. Same as the result from 
Chapter 5.3, the reimbursement ratio 𝜁 and framework benefit factor 𝜆 both have near-
linear relationships with the risk-free rate of interest rf, and that the feasibility of the 
framework is highly influenced by rf. For the lowest point, i.e. where rf is 0.5%, the 10-
year reimbursement ratio is only 22.9% and its positive effect on retrofit is likely to be 











































times as the original investment of the government agency. Considering a highly 
fluctuating rf and a relatively long period of framework implementation, the use of 
average reimbursement ratio presented in Section 6.2 can be a more accurate estimation.  
 
Fig. 16: Sensitivity analysis based on varying contract term (flood) 
Fig. 16 sets forth the average reimbursement ratios for possible contract lengths 
ranging from one year up to the expected building service life of 30 years. Since 𝜆 is an 
annual measuring factor and therefore unaffected by variance in the contract term, it is 
not included here. Similar as the result in Section 5.3, the relationship between contract 
year and reimbursement ratio is not linear, and yearly benefit from the framework 
diminishes. Yet flood mitigation has a much better performance than flood mitigation, 

























Fig. 17: Sensitivity analysis based on varying annual interest rate (flood) 
The effect of the annual interest rate (r) in this framework ranges from 3% to 
7.5%. Again, as in the case of contract length and for the same reasons, only the 
reimbursement ratio is investigated. As shown in Fig. 17, the average reimbursement 
ratio exhibits a minor decrease as the annual interest rate increases, since the standard (r) 
of calculating equivalence current value from future incomes changes.  
6.4 Discussion 
From the results presented in Section 6.2, it can be seen that the benefit from retrofit-
derived reductions in RHC can, in some cases, offset the entire retrofit cost within 10 
years. The overall performance of this framework in flood mitigation is shown to be 
much better than in flood retrofit. While the highest payback rate in flood partnership 
achieves only about 50%, the payback rate in flood mitigation under the same situation 























investment to seismic and flood mitigation projects, which may be resulted by the higher 
effectiveness and lower cost of flood retrofit itself.  
Similar to the result in Section 5.4, the framework may not be deemed worthwhile 
in highly flood-resistant regions, in light of flood retrofit reimbursement of perhaps less 
than 10% and a payback time as long as 10 years in extreme cases; however, in highly 
vulnerable regions, this partnership between government and insurer alone can provide 
enough benefit to cover the whole retrofit cost within a much shorter time, for instance, 
the full reimbursement of census block 1 and 2 can be expected to achieve within only 5 
years, and this should make it attractive to all parties, government agencies especially. 
Fig. 13 has also shown that the total benefit from this PPP is up to1.5 times of the amount 
of benefit utilized from the reduction of AAL each year, which can provide a much 
higher motivation to undertake seismic retrofit in highly vulnerable regions. Combining 
the result in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, it is reasonable to conclude that this framework can 
be highly applicable to most natural hazard mitigations, as long as the vulnerability level 
is relatively high in the framework performing region. This can also be considered as a 
advantage of this framework, which will help to allocate the mitigation investment to the 
most vulnerable regions. 
Similar to the result in Section 5, the sensitivity analysis in this chapter has also 
shown that the proposed framework is highly affected by the risk-free rate of interest, 
which is inherently highly fluctuating. Yet, if a mitigation project is maintained as a long-
term partnership, the influence of rf can be minor. The research suggests that longer 
contract periods can result in a slightly lower marginal benefit, and so a partnership 




the optimum choice. A lower interest rate, meanwhile, can result in a slightly higher 
reimbursement ratio, yet such changes can be minor and may not affect the overall 




Chapter 7: Conclusion and Further Development 
7.1 Conclusion 
The two main methods of natural hazard mitigation, building retrofit and insurance, have 
been used around the world, yet not always successfully, due to their high cost and low 
incentives, both to governments and property owners. This thesis has presented a new 
PPP framework that, by involving the insurance industry, can fully utilize the projected 
future benefit from retrofitting to reimburse the cost of the retrofit projects themselves. 
The partnership between government and insurance companies in this framework 
provides additional benefits for the insurer in the form of natural hazard insurance and 
partial government subsidies for building-retrofit projects. It can also provide a high 
incentive for insurance and retrofit procurement among property owners. 
A case study of earthquake mitigation carried out in a highly vulnerable city in 
Israel validates the general feasibility of this framework. The result also confirms the 
market-driving nature of this framework, which has the potential to generate momentum 
for mitigation action in most vulnerable regions through market behavior. The framework 
benefit factor, proposed and calculated in this research to compare the effectiveness and 
benefit of various schemes involving retrofit and insurance, shows the much larger 
overall positive influence of the proposed framework. The framework can also be used to 
mitigate other natural hazards including floods, hurricanes, etc., that require building 
retrofit and catastrophe insurance to improve resilience. In the case study of flood 
mitigation carried out in Miami-Dade county under continuous threat of flood, the 
framework achieves payback rate 3 times as much as it achieves in seismic retrofit 




mitigation investment reimbursed within 5 years. The BCR values in these cases also 
achieves up to twice higher than the average BCR of FEMA invested projects in seismic 
risk mitigation and nearly 100% higher in flood risk mitigation. The result of these 
measuring parameters has shown a high potential of implementing this partnership to 
different natural hazard mitigation projects. 
A potential partnership can be invested by any natural hazard risk mitigating 
organizations, which includes the Division of Emergency Management for each state, 
FEMA for a federal level and World Bank or NHMA for a cross-nation project. The 
investigation to the payback rate shows these government agencies or organizations can 
have a reimbursement of 50% of its initial investment or higher during the 10-year 
partnership, which enables the government agency, or any other investors, such as the 
World Bank in hazard mitigation projects worldwide, to invest on twice or higher the 
amount of projects as it can support without this partnership. Besides, this framework can 
also be utilized by insurance firms or government-run insurance companies as a method 
of motivating property owners in insurance coverage purchasing. 
Besides the increased incentives on risk mitigation practices it generates to the 
government agency, the insurer and the property owner and the reduction in expense and 
increased benefit it can provide, this partnership also helps to provide a larger market of 
risk mitigation to contractors in building and facility rehabilitation. Further partnerships 





7.2 Further Developments 
In future research, I intend to investigate the effectiveness of this framework vis-à-vis 
social and environmental factors, and to conduct a comprehensive analysis of its 
influence on decision-making by property owners and governments. This thesis has 
assumed that the property owners’ intention to participate in this framework is increased 
based on the extra benefit in participating, while a more accurate investigation of the 
property owners’ intention is still needed for the full estimation of this framework in the 
aspect of all participating parties. The contents in this thesis also includes only the case 
studies in the performance of this partnership in seismic and flood mitigation, while in 
the further research a consideration of multi-hazard mitigation implementation and the 
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